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ACADEMIC ESPIONAGE: STRIKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN
OPEN AND COLLABORATIVE UNIVERSITIES AND PROTECTING
NATIONAL SECURITY
Erin N. Grubbs*
American universities and research laboratories strive to foster
open, collaborative spaces, where students from all over the world
can come to learn from leading academics in their field of study.
However, some people believe this open and collaborative
environment is threatened by international students who are coming
not to add to the environment, but rather to take from it. Academic
espionage is not a new problem, but it is a problem that the Trump
administration and Congress are working diligently to solve.
Lawmakers, administrative agencies, and universities are striving
to determine whether there are enough safeguards in place to
protect the United States’ intellectual property. Alternatively, others
are wondering whether the restrictions being put in place are truly
necessary or if they are instead hindering the open exchange of
ideas that is needed to advance science and research. This Recent
Development argues that better awareness about academic
espionage, not more safeguards, is required to protect the United
States’ academic institutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
American universities are a staple of academic advancements in
science and technology not only in the United States, but around the
world. These universities produce talented American scholars, along
with individuals who return to their home countries and lead top
businesses and governmental affairs abroad.1 American universities
thrive on fostering collaborative environments where ideas shared
among peers and colleagues advance various fields, especially
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.
With this great power though, comes great responsibility.2 There
is a growing concern these American universities, which pride
1
Student Visa Integrity: Protecting Educational Opportunity and National
Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border Sec. and Immigration of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018) [hereinafter Student Visa Integrity]
(statement of Sen. Mazie Hirono, Member, Subcomm. on Border Sec. and
Immigration).
2
SPIDERMAN (Columbia Pictures 2002).
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themselves on their open-door policies and collaborative
environments, are perhaps opening their doors too wide.3 American
government officials and agencies fear information vital to national
security and defense may walk out the door with foreign nationals,
back to their home countries, ultimately to be used against the
United States.4 In 2018, the Senate Subcommittee on Border
Security and Immigration held a hearing titled “Student Visa
Integrity: Protecting Educational Opportunities and National
Security.”5 This hearing, along with other discussions at the federal
level and with universities, considered whether enough safeguards
are in place to protect American information from academic
espionage.6
This Recent Development discusses academic espionage
broadly, and then considers the current legal structure in place to
stop proprietary academic knowledge and research from leaving the
United States when it should not. Part II defines academic espionage
and lays out the landscape of international students that have
attended or are attending American universities. Part III describes
the current legal basis to protect academic knowledge at these
universities. Part IV discusses three recent academic espionage
cases. Part V explores recommendations and what else can be done
to combat this issue.
II. THE GROWING CONCERN AROUND ACADEMIC ESPIONAGE
Academic espionage is not a new phenomenon.7 The United
States has long feared that its international adversaries may leverage
the open environments of universities to siphon off technical
information.8 Academic espionage specifically focuses on the
3

Student Visa Integrity, supra note 1.
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Hdeel Abdelhady, Trade Wars: Restricting Foreign Access to US Technology,
LAW360 (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1093803/trade-warsrestricting-foreign-access-to-us-technology.
8
See generally DANIEL GOLDEN, SPY SCHOOLS: HOW THE CIA, FBI, AND
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SECRETLY EXPLOIT AMERICA’S UNIVERSITIES 39 (2017)
(noting how the fear of universities being a prime location for espionage dates
4
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gathering of intelligence information from a university setting. 9
From research labs to classrooms across the United States, foreign
countries may look for “access to sensitive military and civilian
research.”10
With the number of international students in the United States
exceeding one million for the third year in a row,11 the concerns
around academic espionage remain germane. Central to
understanding these concerns is how the term academic espionage
is defined and the role it plays in the higher education system in the
United States.
A. Defining Academic Espionage
Espionage is defined as “the practice of spying or using spies to
obtain information about the plans and activities especially of a
foreign government or a competing company.”12 Espionage is one
of the world’s oldest professions, beginning with references “in the
Bible, in ancient Greece, and in ancient China.”13 Although a known
problem, few international treaties address espionage.14 The
conundrum with espionage is that nations promote and acknowledge
their own intelligence agencies for seeking out vital intel while
denouncing foreign intelligence agencies for violating sovereignty.15

back to the Cold War, evidenced by the fact that “[o]f 400 Soviet exchange
students who attended U.S. universities from 1965 to 1975, the FBI identified
more than 100 as intelligence officers”).
9
Id. at xvii.
10
Id. at xvii-xviii.
11
Number of International Students in the United States Reaches New High of
1.09 Million, INST. OF INT’L EDUC. (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.iie.org/WhyIIE/Announcements/2018/11/2018-11-13-Number-of-International-StudentsReaches-New-High.
12
Espionage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/espionage (last visited Mar. 2, 2019).
13
Darien Pun, Comment, Rethinking Espionage in the Modern Era, 18 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 353, 355 (2017) (footnotes omitted).
14
Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in From the Cold War: Intelligence
and International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1072, n.4 (2006) (noting the
only existing treaties related to intelligence are focused on intelligence-sharing
between allies, such as United Kingdom-USA Intelligence Agreement).
15
Pun, supra note 13, at 355.
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Academic espionage is specifically focused on data and
information being taken from university settings and has long been
on the radar of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and the
Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”).16 As early as the 1960s–70s,
the FBI and CIA monitored foreign students from Iran, China, and
the Soviet Union, searching for possible informants and intelligence
officers.17 Recent high-profile academic espionage incidents have
government officials questioning if enough is being done to combat
this intrusion. For example, “[in] March of 2019 the U.S.
Department of Justice indicted nine Iranian individuals for allegedly
hacking into the accounts of professors across 144 American
universities and stealing more than $3.4 billion in intellectual
property and research data.”18
Academic freedom does not come without a cost.19 American
taxpayers pay for academic research and development engaged in
by the United States government.20 The cost is often considered
worthwhile because of the social benefit of progressing
knowledge.21 Most of this research, funded by American taxpayers,
is considered fundamental and thus does not have restrictions on it;
however, some of the research is off-limits to foreign students.22 In
2014, the United States Department of Defense23 found that “nearly
16

See Michaela Ross, Spy Theft of U.S University Research Sparks Call for
Action, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 11, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/techand-telecom-law/spy-theft-of-us-university-research-sparks-call-for-action-1.
See generally GOLDEN, supra note 8, at 33–40 (discussing FBI and CIA
investigations of academic espionage).
17
See generally GOLDEN, supra note 8, at 33–40 (discussing FBI and CIA
investigations of academic espionage).
18
Ross, supra note 16.
19
Joy Blanchard, A Struggle of Foreign Policy, State Power, and Academic
Freedom: Faculty Senate of Florida International University v. Florida, 2014
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 187, 189 (2014) (quoting Robert Post, The Structure of
Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 73
(Beshara Doumsani ed., Zone Books 2006)).
20
GOLDEN, supra note 8, at 7 (stating the United States government funds a
great deal of academic research and development, spending $27.4 billion in 2014).
21
Blanchard, supra note 19, at 189.
22
Id.
23
All departments and agencies referenced in this Recent Development are
United States agencies.
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a quarter of all foreign efforts to obtain sensitive or classified
information” was through academic institutions.24 This finding
resulted in an increase in scrutiny when considering who should and
should not be allowed to enter the United States to study.25
B. International Students in Higher Education in the United
States
The 2017–2018 academic year was the third year in a row that
international student enrollment in American universities surpassed
one million.26 International students comprised 5.5 percent of the
total student population at American universities in the 2017–2018
academic year.27 Approximately 35 percent of those students
enrolled were in graduate programs.28 Roughly one-third of the
international students studying in the United States were from
China.29
Depending on the field of study, some programs are more
heavily populated with international students than others.30 Overall,
approximately 45 percent of international students in 2017–2018
studied engineering, math, computer science, or physical and life
sciences.31 In 2015, approximately 81 percent of electrical
engineering graduate students and 79 percent of computer science
graduate students were international students.32 In 2016,
24

Ana Swanson & Keith Bradsher, White House Considers Restricting Chinese
Researchers Over Espionage Fears, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/30/us/politics/trump-china-researchersespionage.html.
25
See generally id. (discussing the potential restrictions on Chinese nationals
being admitted to the United States to perform research at American universities).
26
Enrollment, INST. OF INT’L EDUC. (2018), https://www.iie.org/Research-andInsights/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students/Enrollment.
27
Id.
28
Id. (noting 382,953 international students enrolled in a graduate program in
the 2017–2018 academic year).
29
Id. (stating that 363,341 Chinese students were enrolled in American
universities in 2017–2018).
30
See id.
31
Id. (noting 21.3 percent studied engineering, 17 percent studied math and
computer science, and 7.2 percent studied physical and life sciences).
32
Stuart Anderson, Guess Who’s Not Coming to America? International
Students, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/
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approximately 39 percent of the graduate students studying science
and engineering at American universities were temporary visa
holders.33
Despite the previous prominence of foreign citizens in graduate
programs, the numbers of international graduate students began
dropping in recent years.34 United States graduate enrollment saw a
3.7 percent decline in international students between 2016 to 2017.35
This decline is projected to double in the coming year.36 There was
a 1.1 percent increase in first-time graduate enrollment of United
States citizens and permanent residents, emphasizing the fact that
only international students, not overall graduate enrollment,
dropped.37 An even steeper decline is seen when looking at specific
programs.38 For example, American physics PhD programs saw a 12
percent decrease in applicants from 2017 to 2018.39
Universities provide various reasons for this drop in
international student enrollment. Some universities believe changes
2018/03/02/guess-whos-not-coming-to-america-internationalstudents/#55113ed23c3e.
33
NAT’L SCI. FOUND., NAT’L CTR. SCI. & ENGINEERING STATS., Table 13.
Graduate Students in Science, Engineering, and Health in All Institutions, by
Field, Citizenship, Ethnicity, and Race: 2011–16, in SURVEY OF GRADUATE
STUDENTS AND POSTDOCTORATES IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING FALL 2016
(2018),
https://ncsesdata.nsf.gov/gradpostdoc/2016/html/GSS2016_DST_13.html.
34
See generally Kerrie Kennedy, US: International Graduate Students Drop
4%, Trump a Potential Factor, THE PIE NEWS (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://thepienews.com/news/us-international-graduate-student-enrolmentsdown-4-trumps-policies-a-potential-factor/ (stating the enrollment of
international graduate students at American universities went from a 0.9 percent
decrease in the 2015–2016 academic year to 3.7 percent in the 2016–2017
academic year).
35
Id.
36
Student Visa Integrity, supra note 1 (statement by Sen. Dick Durbin, Ranking
Member, Subcomm. on Border Sec. and Immigration).
37
Id.
38
See generally Alexis Wolfe, US Physics PhD Programs See Drop in
International
Applications,
PHYSICS
TODAY
(June
8,
2018),
https://physicstoday.scitation.org/do/10.1063/PT.6.2.20180608a/full/ (clarifying
a decrease in international applications does not necessarily mean a decrease in
international student enrollments).
39
Id.
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to immigration policy caused international visitors to stop applying
for graduate programs.40 Others believe the drop may be attributable
to international students being more deliberate in how they pursue
their graduate education and seeking universities outside of the
United States.41 Specifically, in the science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics fields, an increase in global
competition may be contributing to the decline in international
graduate students.42
Part of the concern with decreasing international student
enrollment is the financial aspect.43 International students studying
in American higher education institutions contribute an estimated
$37 billion to the United States economy annually.44 In 2017,
Chinese students alone “contributed $11 billion to the U.S.
economy, while Indian students contributed another $5 billion.”45
Thus, a drop in international students can have large financial
impacts at universities.
III. CURRENT AND PROPOSED REQUIREMENTS FOR FOREIGN
CITIZENS STUDYING IN THE UNITED STATES
Safeguards to ensure that academic research and data are not
subject to academic espionage are paramount. As such, the United
States has several layered safeguards to protect its information. The
first safeguard in place is the requirement that foreign citizens obtain
a student visa to study at an American university. After an
international citizen obtains a student visa, export control
regulations provide a second safeguard to protect research and data
40

JULIE BAER, FALL 2017 INTERNATIONAL STUDENT ENROLLMENT HOT TOPICS
SURVEY 1, 4–5 (2017) (finding that of the 552 institutions that responded to the
survey, 68.4 percent cited visa application process or visa delays/denials as a
major factor contributing to new international student declines).
41
Kennedy, supra note 34.
42
Wolfe, supra note 38 (citing to PhD programs in China and Japan increasing
in quality, although not providing specific statistics in enrollment).
43
See Student Visa Integrity, supra note 1 (statement by Sen. Dick Durbin,
Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Border Sec. and Immigration).
44
Id.
45
Aria Bendix, A Pause in International Students?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/03/a-pause-ininternational-students/519435/.
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from leaving the United States. Executive orders, legislation, and
administrative agency guidance are also used as additional
safeguards in stopping academic espionage.
A. The Process for Foreign Citizens to Gain a Student Visa
When citizens of foreign countries choose to come to the United
States to study, they must obtain a student visa. 46 There are two
nonimmigrant visa categories that foreign citizens can apply to in
order to study full-time in the United States.47 A Category F visa is
required for “an alien having a residence in a foreign country which
he has no intention of abandoning, who is a bona fide student
qualified to pursue a full course of study” to enter the United States
to study at a college or university.48 A Category M visa is required
for those students who want to study at a “vocational or other
recognized nonacademic institution, other than a language training
program.”49
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) runs the
Student and Exchange Visitor Program (“SEVP”).50 “SEVP
provides approval and oversight to schools authorized to enroll F
and M nonimmigrant students and gives guidance to both schools
and students about the requirements for maintaining [the student’s]
status.”51 When a foreign citizen is applying for an F or M visa, the
person must first apply and be accepted to a SEVP-approved

46
There are over twenty types of nonimmigrant visas for those traveling
temporarily to the United States. See About Visas – The Basics, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE: BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFF., https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/usvisas/visa-information-resources/frequently-asked-questions/about-basics.html
(last visited Apr. 4, 2019). There are additional visas for people coming to live
permanently in the United States. Id. The required visa depends on the purpose of
the travel. Id.
47
Students and Employment, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES.,
https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/students-and-exchangevisitors/students-and-employment (last updated Aug. 9, 2018).
48
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i) (2018).
49
Id. § 1101(a)(15)(M)(i).
50
Student and Exchange Visitor Program, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/sevis (last updated Nov. 14, 2018).
51
Id.
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school.52 SEVP-approved schools include colleges, universities, and
vocational schools.53
DHS also administers the Student and Exchange Visitor
Information System (“SEVIS”), which is a web-based system
designed to maintain “information on international nonimmigrant
students and exchange visitors in the United States.”54 SEVIS
provides for proper reporting and recordkeeping regarding
nonimmigrant and exchange visitors and offers a way to track visa
violators for which enforcement action should be taken.55
International citizens coming to study in the United States remain
within the SEVIS database throughout their time studying in the
United States.56
As part of the visa application, a vetting process occurs when
foreign citizens apply to study in the United States. The applicant
begins by completing an online nonimmigrant visa application form,
scheduling an interview, and paying a processing fee.57 The
application and screening system occur at the consular office and
include “personal interviews, which employ analytic interview
techniques, multiple biographic and biometric checks, and
interagency review.”58 The biographic and biometric checks include
fingerprints and full-face photographs, which are then crossreferenced against multiple databases maintained by the U.S.
government.59 A visa will not be issued unless “all relevant concerns
ASS’N OF AM. UNIVS., UNIVERSITY VISA SCREENING PROCEDURES
OVERVIEW 1 (2018), https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU-Files/KeyIssues/Immigration/University-Visa-Screening-Procedures-Overview.pdf.
53
See generally U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SEVP
CERTIFIED
SCHOOLS:
UPDATED
SEPTEMBER
19,
2018
(2018),
https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/assets/certified-school-list-09-19-18.pdf (listing
all of the SEVP certified schools).
54
Student and Exchange Visitor Program, supra note 50.
55
Id.
56
Student Visa Integrity, supra note 1 (statement of Edward Ramotowski,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, United States Department of State).
57
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-608, NONIMMIGRANT VISAS
OUTCOMES OF APPLICATIONS AND CHANGES IN RESPONSE TO 2017 EXECUTIVE
ACTIONS 11 (Aug. 2018).
58
Student Visa Integrity, supra note 1 (statement of Edward Ramotowski,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, United States Department of State).
59
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 57, at 15.
52
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raised during this process are fully resolved.”60 Criminal convictions
or “reasonable suspicion” of criminal behavior may be cause for visa
denial.61 Even after passing the consular office review, the visa only
admits the student to travel to a port of entry.62 Once at the port of
entry additional permission is needed from a Customs and Border
Protection Officer.63
In general, student and exchange visitor visa issuances
decreased each year from fiscal years 2015 through 2017.64 In 2017,
814,138 student and exchange visitor visas were issued, which was
down from 1,064,176 in 2015.65 In the same year, the United States
government refused 18 percent of student and exchange visa
applicants.66 The majority of refusals were related to the applicants
not being able to overcome the presumption of an intent to
immigrate or the applicant not meeting the visa eligibility criteria.67
B. Export Control Regulations
In addition to student visas, another protective function the
United States has in place is export control regulations “to protect
the national security and foreign policy interests” of the country. 68
Export control regulations focus on regulating the “transfer of
specific or general types of technology to foreign persons.”69 The
Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and State each have
60

Student Visa Integrity, supra note 1 (statement of Edward Ramotowski,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, United States Department of State).
61
ASS’N OF AM. UNIVS., supra note 52.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 57, at 57.
65
Id. (reporting 420,992 F type visas issued, 383,165 J-type visas issued, and
9,981 M-type visas issued in 2017).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Overview: Federal Agencies and their Export Control Regulations, STAN. U.
(Feb. 1, 2019) [hereinafter Overview], https://doresearch.stanford.edu/researchscholarship/export-controls/overview#federal-agencies-and-their-export-controlregulations.
69
Modernizing Export Controls: Protecting Cutting-Edge Technology and U.S.
National Security Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 115th Cong. (2018)
[hereinafter Modernizing Export Controls] (testimony of Mario Mancuso, Senior
Visiting Fellow for Int’l Sec., The Hudson Inst., Partner, Kirkland & Ellis).
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regulations pertaining to export controls.70 Export control
regulations cover everything from commodities to information
technology to software to services.71
The Bureau of Industry and Security72 issued Export
Administration Regulations (“EAR”) pertaining to “dual-use”
items, meaning those items that have civil and military
applications.73 The EAR implements the Export Administration Act
of 1979.74 The EAR defines items and activities subject to the
regulation as activities “related to the proliferation of nuclear
explosive devices, chemical or biological weapons, [or] missile
technology.”75 Additionally, the EAR contains a Commerce Control
List, describing items, commodities, software, and technology
subject to the authority of the Bureau of Industry and Security. 76 If
an item or activity is subject to the EAR, various prohibitions may
apply.77 In addition, a license may be required for an item or activity
depending on the country where the item is going, the end-use, or
end-user.78
Items not considered dual-use may still be subject to the Office
of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”)79 economic and trade
sanctions, which focus on United States foreign policy and national
security interests.80 The Foreign Assets Control Regulations pertain
70

Overview, supra note 68.
Modernizing Export Controls, supra note 69 (prepared remarks of Kevin J.
Wolf, Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld).
72
This bureau is within the United States Department of Commerce.
73
Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 730.1–.10 (2018).
74
Id. § 730.2 (citing the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app.
2401–2420). However, the Export Administration Act of 1979 was repealed in
2018 by the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. The Export Control Reform Act
of 2018 also requires the Secretary of Commerce to establish controls under the
Export Administration Regulation. John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, H.R. 5515, 115th Cong. (2018).
75
15 C.F.R. § 734.
76
Id. § 734.1.
77
Id. § 736.
78
Id. §§ 738, 744.
79
This office is within the United States Department of Treasury.
80
About: Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Officeof-Foreign-Assets-Control.aspx (last updated Apr. 5, 2019)
71
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to transactions, meaning payment or transfer, export or withdrawal,
or transfer of credit.81 OFAC maintains lists of sanctions focused on
specifically designated nationals and countries.82
Lastly, the Department of State issued the International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”).83 The ITAR implements the Arms
Export Control Act, which covers “the export and temporary import
of defense articles and services.”84 The ITAR defines defense
articles with an extensive list of United States Munitions ranging
from nonautomatic and semiautomatic firearms to “any explosive,
propellant, pyrotechnic, fuel, oxidizer, binder, additive, or
precursor” that “is being developed using classified information.”85
Defense services are defined as assisting foreign persons in
developing defense articles.86 The ITAR requires registration of
persons who deal with defense articles or furnish defense services.87
Additionally, the Department of State issues licenses for the export
or temporary import of defense articles.88
C. Exclusions from Export Regulations
Dating as far back as 1981, concerns about the balance of
national security and collaborative university environments arose.89
In 1981, five presidents from prominent American research
universities raised their concerns about proposed export controls to
the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce.90 This prompted
81

Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.308 (2018).
Consolidated Sanctions List Data Files, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Mar. 14,
2019), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDNList/Pages/consolidated.aspx.
83
International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 120–30 (2018).
84
Id. § 120.2 (citing the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751).
85
Id. § 121.1 Category V (h) (2018).
86
Id. § 120.9(a)(1). The full definition of defense services includes assisting in
“design, development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly,
assembling,
testing,
repair,
maintenance,
modification,
operation,
demilitarization, destruction, processing or use of defense articles.” Id.
87
See id. § 122.1(a).
88
See id. § 123.1(a).
89
NEAL LANE, Tighter Controls to Prevent Espionage at U.S. Research
Laboratories Are Harmful, in ESPIONAGE AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 106–
07 (Louise I. Gerdes ed., 2004).
90
Id.
82
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President Reagan to issue National Security Decision Directive 189
in 1985.91 The directive defined fundamental research and the
Administration’s desire to keep fundamental research unrestricted.92
Today, in an academic setting, such as a research lab or
university, there are three key types of information that fall outside
of export control regulations: fundamental research, educational
information, and published information exclusions.93 Fundamental
research is comprised of basic science and engineering results that
would ordinarily be “published and shared broadly within the
scientific community . . . .”94 Fundamental research is distinct from
non-fundamental research, which may be “restricted for proprietary
or national security reasons.”95 Educational information is
comprised of information taught at a university or an associated
teaching laboratory during normal instruction.96 Published
information consists of already published or public domain
information.97 If the information can be categorized as fundamental
research, educational information, or published information, it is not
subject to export control regulations.98
Oftentimes, the confusion around what constitutes fundamental
research can get universities in trouble.99 Most university activities
91

Id.
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NSDD-189, NATIONAL POLICY ON THE
TRANSFER OF SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND ENGINEERING INFORMATION 1 (1985)
[hereinafter NSDD-189], https://research.archives.gov/id/6879779 (defining
fundamental research as “basic and applied research in science and engineering,
the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the
scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and from
industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of
which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons”).
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(last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
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FAQs, OHIO ST. U. OFF. OF RES. & COMPLIANCE, http://orc.osu.edu/
regulations-policies/exportcontrol/faqs/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
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falls into the category of fundamental research and are thus exempt
from export controls.100 However, research is not fundamental if the
university accepts certain publication restrictions,101 is funded by the
government and there are protections on the information,102 or the
research is funded by a corporate sponsor and there is a
prepublication review requirement.103
Additionally, confusion around “deemed exports is a major risk
for universities.”104 A “deemed export” is when there is a release or
transfer of “technology”105 to a foreign person.106 Therefore, even
having a foreign national work on certain projects and see
information can be considered a deemed export.107 Many American
universities clarify within policy documents the export control
requirements and how they apply to the university to protect against
potential violations.108
D. Executive Orders to Combat Academic Espionage
A recent addition to the protective measures against academic
espionage occurred in December 2017 when President Trump
Regulations Change University Research, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 281, 286 (2010)
(discussing how most university activity constitutes fundamental research, but
some activities universities undertake are outside of the fundamental research
exception and thus “it is important to know what exactly places [university]
activity outside of the exemption”).
100
Id.
101
See id. (citing the EAR requirements, 15 C.F.R. § 734.8).
102
See id. (citing the ITAR requirements, 22 C.F.R. § 120.11(a)).
103
See id. (citing the EAR requirements, 15 C.F.R. § 734.8).
104
See id. at 284.
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The EAR defines technology as “information necessary for the
‘development,’ ‘production,’ ‘use,’ operation, installation, maintenance, repair,
overhaul, or refurbishing . . . of an item.” 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2018).
106
Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 734.13(a)(2) (2018).
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Metcalf, supra note 99, at 284.
108
See, e.g., Export Controls, STAN. U. https://doresearch.stanford.edu/
research-scholarship/export-controls (last visited Apr. 4, 2019); Export Control,
OHIO ST. U. OFF. OF RES. & COMPLIANCE, http://orc.osu.edu/regulationspolicies/exportcontrol/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2019); Export Control, BOS.
U., http://www.bu.edu/researchsupport/compliance/export-control/ (last visited
Apr. 4, 2019); Export Controls, U. OF MICH., https://researchcompliance.umich.edu/export-controls (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
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announced his National Security Strategy.109 President Trump
highlighted a need to “tighten visa procedures” in the “Promote and
Protect the U.S. National Security Innovation Base” section of his
National Security Strategy.110 That section states the administration
will “consider restrictions on foreign [science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics] students from designated countries
to ensure that intellectual property is not transferred to our
competitors, while acknowledging the importance of recruiting the
most advanced technical workforce to the United States.”111
Universities are mentioned within the “Protect Data and Underlying
Infrastructure” subheading of the National Security Strategy and are
encouraged to “defeat espionage and theft.”112
President Trump is not the first president to propose these types
of restrictions on foreign students. In 1949, while discussing the
Atomic Energy Commission, the Senate heard arguments about
restricting the exportation of radioisotopes and considering whether
or not this type of export was basic research.113 In 1952, arguments
were raised against “McCarthy-era restrictions on visas for foreign
nationals.”114 During the Cold War, export control regulations came
back onto the radar of United States government officials.115 The
goal with export controls during the Cold War was to “buy time,
preserve the U.S. lead, and keep adversaries from exploiting the
latest technological developments.”116 President Reagan issued the

109
WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (2017).
110
Id. at 22.
111
Id.
112
Id.; see also Andy J. Semotiuk, Foreign Students to Deal with Uncertainties
Under New U.S. Immigration Policy, FORBES (June 13, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andyjsemotiuk/2018/06/13/raising-the-bar-oninternational-students-new-uscis-policy-looks-to-target-collegestudents/#7b31d93955fb.
113
John Krige, National Security and Academia: Regulating the International
Circulation of Knowledge, BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Mar.–Apr. 2014, at
42, 43.
114
Id. at 43–44.
115
See LANE, supra note 89, at 107.
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National Security Decision Directive during the Cold War era
focusing on the definition of fundamental research.117
Following the 2001 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush
also enforced strict visa policies on graduate students.118 In addition
to visa policy controls, the United States turned a greater focus to
export controls after the September 11 attacks.119 The Commission
Report following the September 11 terrorist attacks found that “the
9/11 terrorists and their supporters relied on access to U.S.-origin
technologies and financial networks to achieve their scheme.”120
Following the attacks, the enforcement of export controls became a
focus of the Department of Justice.121
The Obama administration also proposed a rule that would limit
the resources available to United States’ colleges working on
company-sponsored research pertaining to munitions, nuclear
engineering, and satellite technologies.122 When the Obama
administration proposed that rule, there were no open cases of
industrial espionage involving university research.123 Yet,
counterterrorism and counter nuclear proliferation experts believed
universities were “soft targets” for espionage.124
At the same time, President Obama focused on updating the
export control system and taking a hard look at “what we control,
117

Krige, supra note 113, at 44.
See Jeffrey Mervis, More Restrictive U.S. Policy on Chinese Graduate
Student Visas Raises Alarm, SCI. (June 11, 2018), http://www.sciencemag.org/
news/2018/06/more-restrictive-us-policy-chinese-graduate-student-visas-raisesalarm.
119
See Tara L. Dunn, Surviving United States Export Controls Post 9/11: A
Model Compliance Program, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 435, 441 (2005).
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Id. at 436 (citing 9/11 COMMISSION, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
UNITED STATES 362–63 (2004), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/
911Report.pdf).
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Id. at 441.
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Julia Edwards, U.S. Targets Spying Threat on Campus with Proposed
Research Clampdown, REUTERS (May 20, 2016), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-security-students/u-s-targets-spying-threat-on-campus-withproposed-research-clampdown-idUSKCN0YB1QT.
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how we control it, how we enforce those controls, and how we
manage our controls.”125 President Obama’s goal was that beginning
in 2010, and for the next five years, exports would double in order
to support American jobs.126 Although not all of President Obama’s
goals were accomplished, his administration was successful in
harmonizing some licensing policies and consolidating screening
lists from various agencies.127
E. Legislative Attempts to Combat Academic Espionage
Along with actions being taken by the executive branch, the
legislative branch in recent years advanced potential safeguards to
academic espionage concerns. In May 2018, Senator Ted Cruz
proposed the Stop Higher Education Espionage and Threat Act of
2018.128 The bill was designed to amend Chapter 33 of Title 28 of
the United States Code by adding an additional section related
specifically to “designation of foreign intelligence threats to higher
education.”129 The bill did not name any specific countries; however,
Senator Cruz was quoted in the Washington Post as saying,
“Communist China is infiltrating American universities to meddle
with our curricula, silence criticism of their regime, and steal
intellectual property including sensitive dual-use research.”130
Senator Cruz’s bill develops a method for the FBI to designate a
person as a “foreign intelligence threat to higher education”
125

PRESIDENT OBAMA ANNOUNCES FIRST STEPS TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION
OF NEW U.S. EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM, THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE
PRESS SEC’Y (Dec. 9, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2010/12/09/president-obama-announces-first-steps-towardimplementation-new-us-expor.
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See id.
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U.S. EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM AND THE EXPORT CONTROL REFORM INITIATIVE
21 (Apr. 5, 2019) (noting the screening list compiled over “24,000 entities from
existing Commerce, Treasury, and State Department screening lists.”).
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Stop Higher Education Espionage and Theft Act of 2018, S. 2903, 115th
Cong. (2018).
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Id. § 2.
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Josh Rogin, Preventing Chinese Espionage at America’s Universities,
WASH. POST (May 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/joshrogin/wp/2018/05/22/preventing-chinese-espionage-at-americasuniversities/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4293ab74b34f.
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focusing on foreign actors that commit, attempt to commit, or
conspire to commit espionage, kidnapping, or fraud.131 The proposed
bill also describes disclosures required for foreign gifts or contracts
to institutions of higher education.132 As of the writing of this article,
the bill has not moved beyond the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary.133
In August 2018, President Trump signed the John S. McCain
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which
contained the Export Control Reform Act (“ECRA”) of 2018.134 The
ECRA repealed the Export Administration Act of 1979, which
previously provided the statutory authority for the Export
Administration Regulations.135 The need for the ECRA stemmed
from the changes that occurred over the last 40 years since the 1979
Act was passed and from a push for permanent authority.136 The
ECRA establishes numerous new requirements, such as: (1) an
interagency process focusing on “emerging and foundational
technologies” and their export, (2) requiring license requirements
reviews for certain countries, and (3) requiring export licensing by
the Commerce Department to consider “impacts on the [United

131

S. 2903, 115th Cong. § 540D(b)(1) (2018).
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133
S.2903 – Stop Higher Education Espionage and Theft Act of 2018,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2903/
all-actions?overview=closed#tabs (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
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H.R. 5515, 115th Cong. (2018).
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Executive Orders and emergency declarations under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act. AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, THE EXPORT
CONTROL REFORM ACT AND POSSIBLE NEW CONTROLS ON EMERGING AND
FOUNDATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES 2 (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.akingump.com
/images/content/9/7/v2/97168/International-Trade-Alert-09-12-2018-TheExport-Control-Refo.pdf.
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Modernizing Export Controls, supra note 69 (testimony of Kevin J. Wolf,
Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld) (noting the Export Administration Act
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Economics Power Act and thus a more permanent source of authority was
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States] ‘defense industrial base.’”137 The main impact of this
regulatory change will be on new types of technologies considered
critical to national security, in particular “cybersecurity, artificial
intelligence, and machine learning,” which previously did not have
as strong of an emphasis under the regulations.138
F. Guidance from Administrative Agencies Regarding
Academic Espionage
DHS proposed revisions to visa policies in May 2018.139 The
revisions pertained to F visas (student visas), J visas (exchange
visitors), and M visas (vocational students) focusing on when the
visa holders would be considered unlawfully present.140 Unlawful
presence relates to the time when a person is within the United States
when they are not permitted to be or are paroled.141 The Accrual of
Unlawful Presence and F, J, and M Nonimmigrants Policy
Memorandum (“Policy Memorandum”) stated that on or after
August 9, 2018, individuals on F, J, or M nonimmigrant visas will
be considered unlawfully present in the United States when any of
the following conditions occur: (1) the day after the nonimmigrant
is no longer pursuing the course of study or authorized activity they
were admitted into the country for; (2) the day following the
completion of the nonimmigrant’s course of study or program; (3)
the day following the expiration of the nonimmigrant’s form I-94;
or (4) the day after an immigration judge orders the nonimmigrant
be excluded, deported, or removed.142 The goal of the change in

137
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unlawful presence was to lessen the number of visa overstays and
improve implementation of the unlawful presence criteria.143
On October 23, 2018, Guilford College144 filed a lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina challenging the Policy Memorandum.145 The complaint
alleged four causes of action: (1) the Policy Memorandum does not
follow the procedures required by the Administrative Procedure
Act, (2) the Policy Memorandum is arbitrary and capricious, (3) the
Policy Memorandum is inconsistent with the statutory text of the
code pertaining to aliens and nationality (8 U.S.C. § 1182), and (4)
the Policy Memorandum violates the due process guarantee of the
Fifth Amendment.146 The government filed a motion to dismiss the
case in January 2019.147 As of the writing of this article, the case is
still ongoing. Until the court reaches a decision, the Policy
Memorandum remains in full effect.148
Along with DHS, the Department of State issued guidance in
June 2018 regarding F-1 visas for citizens of China.149 The guidance
changed the validity of visa eligibility from five years to one year
for Chinese citizens studying in certain fields such as robotics,
aviation, and manufacturing.150 The concept is likened to needing a
ticket stub to re-enter an event.151 It is not that Chinese students
cannot leave, then re-enter the United States, but their visa, or ticket
143
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Plaintiffs include Guilford College, Guilford College International Club,
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College.
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(M.D.N.C. 2018).
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in this analogy, is only valid for one year instead of five.152 This
raises concerns regarding the ability of Chinese students to attend
international conferences or even to go home to visit their families,
thus possibly putting the Chinese students at a competitive
disadvantage compared to other non-Chinese students.153
IV. ACADEMIC ESPIONAGE CASES
According to the Department of Defense, academic solicitation
of students, professors, scientists or researchers for clandestine
operations went from 8 percent in 2010 to 24 percent in 2014.154 The
Department of Defense also found that “nearly a quarter of all
foreign efforts to obtain sensitive or classified information” had
been done through academic institutions.155 With these numbers on
the rise, the FBI continues to pursue potential cases of academic
espionage in university settings. Some of these pursuits prove
fruitful, while others do not.156 Three key cases are relevant to this
discussion: Ruopeng Liu, Dr. Xiaoxing Xi, and J. Reece Roth. 157
These cases demonstrate the range from unsuccessful academic
espionage charges being brought to successful charges that resulted
in a prison sentence.
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A. Learning from Liu
The case of Ruopeng Liu was opened by the FBI in 2010 based
on allegations that Liu stole intellectual property while studying in
the United States.158 Ruopeng Liu, a Chinese national, came to study
under Dr. David Smith and work in his lab at Duke University.159
Dr. Smith, a renowned professor of computer and electrical
engineering at Duke University, became a target of what was
believed to be academic espionage.160
Dr. Smith focuses on the field of meta-materials, specifically
creation of an invisibility cloak, or a cloak that can conceal objects
from microwaves.161 While working in the lab, Liu engaged in
“suspicious” behavior including inviting two Chinese colleagues to
visit and work in Dr. Smith’s lab.162 Shortly after the visit, an exact
replica of Dr. Smith’s measuring equipment was recreated in Liu’s
old lab in China.163 Although a case was opened on Liu in 2010, the
FBI later closed the case due to a lack of evidence.164
B. What Went Wrong with Xi
The case of Dr. Xiaoxing Xi demonstrates a time where the FBI
was wrong in bringing charges of academic espionage.165 The
Department of Justice charged Dr. Xiaoxing Xi, chairman of
Temple University’s physics department, with “sharing sensitive
American-made technology with China.”166 The FBI began
investigating Dr. Xi as a potential spy, ultimately arresting him in
May 2015.167 The FBI did not present evidence of espionage, but
rather, the FBI alleged Dr. Xi shared detailed schematics of a pocket
158
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heater with Chinese researchers.168 The pocket heater was important
to superconductor research and thus subject to export control.169 The
Department of Justice dropped the charges after leading scientists in
the field gave sworn statements that the blueprints were not for a
pocket heater, but rather for a device Dr. Xi invented and shared
with Chinese researchers under normal academic collaboration. 170
As a result of the incorrect charges, Dr. Xi was placed on
administrative leave and the university revoked his title of physics
department chairman.171
Two years later, Dr. Xi filed a lawsuit against the FBI and the
lead FBI agent on his case.172 Dr. Xi, a naturalized United States
citizen, alleged multiple constitutional claims including malicious
prosecution and fabrication of evidence, equal protection and due
process violation, and unlawful search and seizure of property and
belongings.173 Additionally, Dr. Xi alleged multiple torts including
malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence.174 Dr. Xi
brought the action under the United States Constitution and the
Federal Tort Claims Act.175
C. The Tale of Roth
The case of J. Reece Roth is one of the most well-known cases
of academic espionage that resulted in a conviction and ultimately a
prison sentence.176 In 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit convicted J. Reece Roth, a retired electrical
engineering professor at the University of Tennessee, of “one count
of conspiracy, fifteen counts of exporting defense articles and
services without a license, and one count of wire fraud.”177 Roth
168
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worked on contracts related to unmanned surveillance vehicles use
of plasma-based guidance systems.178 The work was done through a
Knoxville technology company who had a contract with the United
States Air Force.179
A grand jury found that Roth took sensitive information to
foreign countries, and shared sensitive information with Chinese
and Iranian students.180 The court determined that because the
ultimate objective of the research was to incorporate the technology
into military drones, the information constituted defense articles and
services pursuant to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.181
Roth was ultimately “sentenced to four years in prison and two years
probation.”182
V. ARE THE CURRENT METHODS TO COMBAT ACADEMIC
ESPIONAGE ENOUGH?
The threat of academic espionage is discussed among various
federal agencies, including the FBI, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and the Department of State.183 The goal is to ensure a
proper amount of protections are in place without being overly
burdensome on a university’s ability to further research and
academic progress.
In the instance of academic espionage, it is difficult to develop
legal oversight that is sufficient, but not too restrictive. Some
advocates believe the current programs are overly burdensome on
institutions and restrict academic innovation.184 Others believe not
enough is being done to protect research pertaining to national
security risks.185 Neither position provides the best approach to the
178
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nation’s problem. Instead, as there are enough regulations currently
in place, the United States should focus on heightening awareness
around existing regulations.
A. Are Current Protections Too Much?
In developing programs to combat academic espionage, it is
crucial to ensure there is no discrimination based on nationality. 186
“To target a whole group of people as being subject to greater
suspicion, based purely on race and national origin, and in advance
of any facts or evidence, goes against the fundamental American
ideals of the presumption of innocence, due process, and equal
protection for all.”187 This could lead to violations of the Equal
Protection clause of the Fifth Amendment.
For example, the Department of State’s June 2018 guidance
document specifically focuses on Chinese citizens.188 This process
of trying to screen out potential spies would not really be detectable
by consulate officers vetting visa applications.189 Additionally, there
is no evidence to show that changing from a five-year to a one-year
visa would deter a potential foreign-spy.190
Similar to the Department of State, the rhetoric used by Senator
Cruz regarding the proposed Stop Higher Education Espionage and
Theft Act of 2018 bill focused on concerns regarding Chinese
students.191 The bill itself does not name any specific countries.192 It
is imperative that the actions of a few do not tarnish an entire

186
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nationality while at the same time balancing the interests of national
security.193
Overly burdensome restrictions on international students can
also lead to a loss of money for the United States and a lack of global
diversity at universities.194 The United States is in a global
competition for talent.195 A decrease in international students at
American universities results in difficult budget cuts as many
universities rely on the often higher tuition rates that foreign
students pay compared with in-state students.196 For example, in
Texas, the 85,000 international students contributed an estimated
$2.1 billion and over 27,000 jobs.197 Similarly, in Illinois, which has
over 52,000 international students, those students contributed $1.8
billion to the economy and over 24,000 jobs.198 The more hurdles the
United States puts in place for foreign citizens to study in the United
States, the more likely those foreign citizens are to pursue degrees
in other countries.199
B. Are Current Protections Not Enough?
A major concern with the current regulations is the ability of
students to transfer programs at a university from a non-sensitive to
a sensitive program.200 Louis Rodi, Deputy Assistant Director of the
National Security Investigations Division in DHS, noted this as a
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major concern and loophole in the current process.201 This concern
is particularly pertinent in larger universities focused on research.
The current regulations do not have a mechanism to flag when
students transfer from non-sensitive programs into sensitive
programs.202 A possible solution would be the university itself
putting in place mechanisms to flag such concerns or implementing
a requirement for a visa holder to declare an intention to change
programs.
Recently, the government focused its efforts of protecting
against academic espionage on China.203 Chinese national students
began studying in the United States in 1978 and the number of
Chinese students studying in the United States continues to grow
each year.204 International students in the United States are made up
of almost one-third Chinese nationals.205 Since 2000, at least 30
people born or raised in China who attended American universities
have been charged with espionage or theft of trade secrets.206 It is
not yet clear if the June 2018 Department of State guidance focused
on Chinese students will be enough to alleviate these concerns
around academic espionage. The discussion around China
continued, at a broader level than just academic espionage, during a
Senate committee hearing entitled: “China’s Non-Traditional
Espionage Against the United States: The Threat and Potential
Policy Responses.”207 The goal of the hearing was to discuss ways
to counter activities such as researchers violating government grants
and cyberattacks on government and private information.208
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C. Are Current Protections Just Right?
In many cases, more robust regulations are not necessary to
protect against academic espionage. Instead, universities should
implement more robust policies and programs aimed at educating
professors and students on export controls in order to prevent
potential academic espionage. Many universities currently have
detailed policies in place.209 These policies focus on applying the
export controls to potential activities at the university.210
For example, The Ohio State University’s (“Ohio State”) policy,
although emphasizing all personnel should be familiar with the
policy, states that individuals specifically working in engineering,
physical and computer sciences, biological sciences, and medicine
should be particularly familiar with the policies.211 Ohio State’s
policy breaks down the procedure for export control into major
categories including export classifications, shipping, and technical
data security.212 Other universities can benefit from developing
similar policies and training materials to ensure consistent education
of export controls. Each university needs to consider the type of
research they engage in to ensure its policy is the right scale for its
specific needs.
Additionally, universities can benefit from centralizing the
oversight for classified programs, unclassified programs, and export
controls to ensure efficient use of resources and management of
information.213 The centralized department can be responsible for
maintaining an export control program and developing a policy for
the university.214 This department can also focus on educating
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university researchers and performing audits as necessary.215 The
benefits of having one centralized program is a focus on information
and protecting assets.216
In addition to centralizing oversight, physical separation of
export control and non-export control research may be advantageous
specifically at large research universities. For example, Georgia
Institute of Technology (“Georgia Tech”) has a separate nonprofit,
research institute called the Georgia Tech Research Institute
(“GTRI”).217 Unlike Georgia Tech, GTRI focuses more in depth on
certain core competencies, such as cybersecurity information,
electromagnetics, and threat systems research and development. 218
The Georgia Tech Office of Research Integrity Assurance
developed a specific training in order to better administer the
required export control information to those at the GTRI.219
Although the same federal regulations apply to everyone, providing
this separate training can ensure those whose research may be most
susceptible to export controls fully understands the regulations and
their applicability.
Similarly, Johns Hopkins University has a separate applied
physics laboratory.220 The Johns Hopkins Applied Physics
Laboratory (“APL”) is the largest university affiliated research
center, and much like GTRI, the center is a nonprofit organization.221
APL was founded in 1942 to find solutions to national security,
scientific, and engineering challenges facing the United States. 222
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APL continues to provide United States government agencies
expertise and support in issues of national priority and to develop
technology.223 Oftentimes, these types of research institutes are
physically separated from the main campus of a university, and have
different security measures than a standard university would in order
to ensure export control protection. Separating these types of
facilities is one way to ensure compliance with federal export
control regulations and protect against academic espionage;
however, it is not warranted at all universities, it depends on the type
of research the university performs.
VI. CONCLUSION
The conversation around academic espionage and export
controls continues to be discussed at various levels of the federal
government. A key issue in academic espionage that remains
unresolved is that of emerging technologies. The Export Control
Reform Act expands technology applicable to export control
regulations to include emerging and foundational technologies. 224
The issue with emerging technologies is the technology is in such
early stages it is not clear what exactly it can be used for, and, thus,
it is not clear which export control regulations, if any, apply. The
ECRA provides for an interagency process to determine what these
emerging and foundational technologies may be and how to
implement controls.225 This will likely impact university research
and may expand the scope of what may be subject to export controls.
A precarious balance exists between remaining a global leader
in academic research and technological advancements while
ensuring intellectual property is not improperly obtained and taken
outside of the country. Export control regulations remain the
strongest safeguard against this academic espionage threat.
Continued implementation, guidance, and policies at the federal and
university level will be vital to ensuring open and collaborative
environments at universities can continue to thrive, while protecting
national security.
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